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2.1. The Impact of Migration on 
Demographic Processes in the 
Region of Former Yugoslavia
Vladimir Nikitović
Introduction
The socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1991) was recognized as the coun-
try with divergent demographic trends among its constituent units 
(republics and autonomous provinces) primarily caused by the differ-
ential natural growth of the population (Josipovič, 2016; Nikitović et 
al, 2016). Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the country, it is 
evident that the demographic trends in the region of the former Yu-
goslavia1 converge, at least when it comes to the natural components 
of demographic change. This process is generally understood in the 
context of the theory of demographic transition (Nikitović, 2016). On 
the other side, international migration in the region has undergone 
more complex changes since 1991. After the intensive displacements 
of autochthonous population within and out of the region, induced by 
the 1990s wars (Nikitović & Lukić, 2010), the whole region of former 
Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia) is recognized as an emigrational at the 
beginning of this century (Fassmann et al., 2014). Former high fertility 
sub-regions, including Kosovo as a European outlier, no longer exist. 
of former Yugoslavia was among the first in Europe to experience pop-
1 The term 'former Yugoslavia' is now commonly used retrospectively. In the 
text, we also use the term ex-Yugoslavia as synonym.
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ulation decline (UN, 2015b) mainly due to the long period of below-
replacement fertility in its most populous parts, supported by emigra-
tion that recently has spread to most of the region.. Furthermore, it 
lacks an attraction for long-term immigration from third countries. It 
is recently estimated that the region of former Yugoslavia, except for 
Slovenia, lost about 4 million inhabitants not including about 1 mil-
lion of former guest-worker population during the 1990–2015 period 
(Josipovič, 2016).
On the other hand, the most recent sudden influx of asylum seek-
ers from West Asia and North Africa, whose final asylum destination 
represent primarily the EU founding member countries, has its tran-
sition route through the region of former Yugoslavia. This, so called, 
Western Balkan route came as a great surprise for most of public and of-
ficials given that the immigration issue, at best, has not been recognized 
in the public discourse and relevant legislation in the region (Rašević 
et al, 2014; Župarić-Iljić, 2013). Consequently, it quite directly opened 
an issue of future migration in the region in terms of both the below-
replacement fertility of autochthonous population and the demographic 
surpluses in politically instable origin societies of immigrants.
Given much higher uncertainty of future migration patterns in 
comparison to fertility and mortality trends, it might seem reason-
able to address a long-term perspective of migration impact on de-
mographic change. The point of such an exercise could be similar to 
the purpose of hypothetic fertility (instant-replacement) and mortality 
(constant) scenarios – by examining the current limits of demographic 
development, we try to achieve two goals at the same time: to assess 
realistic future outcomes and to warn decision makers on future impli-
cations of demographic and migration trends.
As it seems that the successor states of former Yugoslavia could 
experience common migration trends in the future, the central issues 
of the Chapter are as follows: Is the transition to the net immigration 
stage across the whole region possible by the mid-century and what 
might be the effects of expected international migration patterns on 
future demographic change in the region?
Since the republics and provinces of former Yugoslavia retained 
their outer or inter-republic boundaries, there are no obstacles to tem-
poral comparisons – we may use empiric evidence straightforward 
when making assumptions on future demographic trends.
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The theoretical and methodological approach: 
assumptions, data issues, model
In accordance with the goals of the Chapter, it was of particu-
lar importance to choose the methodological approach which would 
enable long-term assumptions on future population dynamics in the 
region of former Yugoslavia in context of relevant theoretical and em-
pirical background. The projection model that is used by the Popula-
tion Division of the UN (hereafter the UN model) for its latest releases 
of the World Population Prospects (2012, 2015) meets the criteria as it 
is based on the recent theoretical achievements in terms of the demo-
graphic transition, while draws its strength from the data on fertility 
and mortality for all countries of the world (Raftery et al, 2014; UN 
2015a). The model has also the technical benefits – it is well docu-
mented, fully transparent, implemented in the open-source R software, 
thus, allowing for easy adjustments and modifications of input param-
eters. On the other side, most commonly used models of future popu-
lation dynamics by national statistical offices or institutes, including 
those by Eurostat, are not adequately documented, relying in most as-
pects of a projection procedure only on subjective opinion of authors, 
with little or no explanation about the reasoning behind chosen as-
sumptions (Keilman, 2008; Nikitović, 2016).
Given the long-term character of the analysis in the Chapter, a 
specific aspect refers to the distinction recognized at the time of the 
first modern projections of population in the region of former Yugo-
slavia (1970) – for the sake of better fertility hypotheses, the republics 
and autonomous provinces were classified in relation to the replace-
ment-fertility level, thus, implicitly indicating a stage of the demo-
graphic transition in which they were. The ‘Early starters’ sub-region 
included Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Central Serbia, while the 
‘Late starters’ encompassed Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ko-
sovo, and Macedonia. The latter sub-region experienced the decline to 
the below replacement fertility level two-three decades later than the 
former (Nikitović, 2016). In terms of net migration, the ‘Early starters’ 
had mainly positive balance during the last two decades (1970s and 
1980s) of former Yugoslavia,2 while emigration has been prevailing 
2 Except for Central Serbia during the 1970s due to intensive emigration of 
'guest workers'. Indeed, the majority of the emigration were almost strictly 
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since the 1990–95 and 2000–05 in Croatia and Serbia excluding Ko-
sovo, respectively. The ‘Late starters’ has been typically emigration sub-
region. Consequently, the results of the projection simulations in the 
Chapter were considered from the viewpoint of this distinction, too.
Theoretical reasoning behind the migration 
assumptions
In the UN model, current levels of net migration across countries 
of the world were generally kept constant until the mid-century, with 
the exception of large recent fluctuations. Afterwards, gradual reduc-
tion of net migration is assumed in order to reach 50 per cent of the 
projected mid-century level by 2100. It is considered as a compromise, 
unlikely to be realized, between the difficulty of predicting the levels 
of immigration or emigration within each country of the world for 
such a far horizon, and the recognition that net migration is unlikely 
to reach zero in individual countries (UN, 2015a: 31). Without disput-
ing the high volatility of future migration, the UN approach could be, 
also, understood as a coherent with its theoretical background of fer-
tility transition, which assumes global convergence towards (or close) 
the replacement fertility level by 2100. However, despite the practical 
considerations that guided the authors of the UN model, the general 
assumption on constant net migration by 2050 is disputable from the 
viewpoint of smaller world areas, such as the region of former Yugo-
slavia, or individual countries. For that reason, we aimed to rely on the 
theoretical framework which could provide more stable grounds for 
assumptions on future net migration in the region of former Yugosla-
via than the constant hypothesis.
What were the guidelines for making assumptions on net migra-
tion in the Chapter? Despite different views regarding the role and sig-
nificance of the drivers of international migration, there is no doubt 
that demographic and economic differentials induce the general shape 
and intensity of migration flows (Bertocci & Strozzi, 2008; Josifidis et 
originated from the Northeast of Central Serbia (Penev&Predojević-Despić, 
2012). If we exclude this emigration area, migration balance of this territory 
would not be negative, particularly for the intensive immigration to the City 
of Belgrade.
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al, 2016). It seems that the current strategical goals of all governments 
in the region are consistent when it comes to the EU accession. Since 
the basic aim of the Chapter refers to the most probable demographic 
future from the viewpoint of migration impact, we adopted the offi-
cial standpoints on the EU future as the pivotal for the long-term as-
sumption on general migration pattern in the region of former Yugo-
slavia. Slovenia and Croatia became the EU member countries in the 
recent period – in 2004 and 2013, respectively. In spite of the recent 
slowdown (‘fatigue’) of the integration process in the Western Balkans, 
enlargement of the EU towards the area, that was set as a priority of 
EU expansion at the 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki 
(European Commission, 2003), still represents the official EU strategy. 
Even the reasons for the previous enlargements towards south and east 
of the continent are considered more political than economic, in com-
parison to the initial association of the countries from Western Europe 
(Bache et al, 2011), certain economic conditions have to be fulfilled 
if a country aims to join the EU. Thus, joining the EU implies that a 
member country, apart from required stability of institutions, achieved 
the existence of a functioning market economy. In practice, realization 
of these factors in a member country should provide the living stand-
ard and quality of life of its citizens that would reduce outflows and 
increase inflows of migrants in the country on a long run.
Starting from the general principles of labor migration theories 
such as ‘push and pull’ model, we based our reasoning behind the mi-
gration assumptions more specifically on the recently developed ‘mod-
el of the migration cycle’ (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012). It assumes that 
a country adapts to a new demographic and economic conditions by 
developing a mechanism to handle new or evolving migratory circum-
stances, which is referred to as a migration cycle. The model is based 
on evidence from the, so called, old immigration countries in Europe, 
which experienced the transition from an emigration to an immigra-
tion country in conditions of the below-replacement fertility (Fass-
mann et al, 2014: 151). This heuristic concept seems to be very con-
venient to explain possible transformation of migration pattern in the 
region of former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, recent empirical evidence 
suggest that the model is not only applicable to the Southern European 
countries, which are becoming typical immigration ones, but that the 
Eastern European states are heading to the same direction (Fassmann 
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& Reeger, 2012: 88). Czech Republic is the best example, as it turned 
from a negative migration balance in the 1980s to a positive one in the 
1990s and 2000s (Drbohlav et al., 2009).
According to the migration cycle model, during the process of 
transition from an emigration to an immigration country, former 
emigration countries go through at least three different stages which 
constitute the migration cycle: an initial, pre-transition or preliminary 
stage (emigration is more important than immigration); an intermedi-
ate or transition stage (immigration typically outweighs emigration); 
and a net immigration or post-transformation stage (immigration is 
acknowledged as a necessary supplement). This very general process 
involves system stability, disturbances and, finally, the emergence of a 
new stability (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012: 67–68).
The migration cycle model, used as the theoretical background 
for the migration hypothesis in this Chapter, implies gradual long-term 
transition from net emigration to net immigration. During the inter-
mediate or transition stage of the migration cycle, a former emigration 
country becomes, step by step, a new immigration country. According 
to the model, it seems that Slovenia, being the first country from the re-
gion of former Yugoslavia that joined the EU, is entering the transition 
stage. Even if Slovenia was an attractive destination for the immigrants 
from the region, given its constantly higher level of economic devel-
opment and standard of living, during the period of socialist Yugosla-
via, its attractiveness rose particularly after Slovenia joined the EU in 
2004 (Kupiszewski et al, 2012). This evidence from the region supports 
the concept of the migration cycle as a useful framework for defining 
our migration hypothesis. In that sense, the region, excluding Slovenia, 
could be considered as stuck in the initial, pre-transition stage, although 
some of its territories might be candidates for entering the intermediate 
stage sooner than others. Similar to the concept of demographic transi-
tion, the migration cycle model does not imply that the stages of the 
cycle last for the same amount of time or exhibit identical characteris-
tics in different countries. It is rather general concept of the transition 
process according to which some countries that are entering the process 
later could potentially require a shorter period of time to adapt than the 
states that transitioned earlier (Fassmann & Reeger, 2012: 67).
From the perspective of the 40-year projection horizon (2015–
2055) in this Chapter, the stages of the migration transition are inter-
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preted in relation to the symbolic turning point of the transition pro-
cess in the region, which is set to the middle of the horizon (2035) 
implying that the whole region of former Yugoslavia will certainly be 
part of the EU by the time. Slovenia is considered as the country in 
the transition stage during the first 20-year period, while it should 
enter the final, stable net immigration stage in the second half of the 
projection. The sub-region of ‘Early starters’ excluding Slovenia is sup-
posed to exit the initial or pre-transition stage by the end of the first 
half of the projection horizon (2035), and to experience the interme-
diate or transition stage in the second 20-year period of the projec-
tion. Indeed, some territories of the sub-region could even progress to 
the post-transformation stage by the end of the projection according 
to the model interpretation, but that is beyond the considerations in 
the Chapter. In any case, during the period between 2035 and 2055, 
it is assumed that immigration typically outweighs emigration in this 
sub-region.
In comparison to the ‘Early starters’, the ‘Late starters’ sub-region 
is assumed to leave the pre-transition stage some 5–10 years later, thus, 
entering the intermediate stage of the migration transition in the last 
10–15 years of the projection horizon. Kosovo is the only territory in 
the region of former Yugoslavia which is not supposed to undergo fun-
damental changes of the system needed for entering the intermediate 
transition stage during the projection period. The slow reductions in 
net emigration seemed to be the maximum achievement for this area 
in the next four decades, which is in accordance with current projec-
tion assumptions by Kosovo statistics agency (KAS, 2013), and recent 
study on Kosovar emigration (Gollopeni, 2016).
Data issues and projection model
Demographic and migration statistics in the region of former Yu-
goslavia suffered a lot in terms of reliability after the dissolution of the 
country in 1991 (Josipovič, 2016; Stanković, 2014). Therefore, the 2015 
UN dataset (https://esa.un.org/UN/wpp/) is used as the best available 
source of demographic inputs in the Chapter. However, several precon-
ditions in terms of input parameters had to be fulfilled before the model 
could be employed for producing simulations of future population in the 
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region. The initial population has to be adjusted for known weaknesses 
of the UN data setas regards Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.3 In case 
of the former, the 2013 census results were not available to the UN staff 
when prepared the estimate on initial population structure but the quite 
distant 1991 census.4 As for the latter, apart from the absence of popula-
tion distribution across the tree constitutive parts of Serbia as defined in 
this Chapter, adjustments of the UN dataset had to be made for popula-
tion who boycotted both censuses in 2011 – Albanians in Central Serbia 
and Serbs in Northern Kosovo, and for significant overestimation of the 
total population by the census conducted in Serbia excluding Kosovo 
(for details see: Nikitović, 2016).
In terms of assumptions concerning the main demographic com-
ponents of population dynamics (fertility, mortality, and migration), 
approach used in the Chapter implied separate hypothesis for the three 
constitutive parts of Serbia unlike the UN approach.5 It was particularly 
important in the case of Kosovo where fertility transition was notably 
lagging behind the other territories of former Yugoslavia (Josipovič, 
2016; Nikitović et al, 2016). Apart from that, this procedure enabled us 
to get separate projection results for each of the eight territories of the 
region, as well as for the region as a whole and two of its sub-regions 
derived for the purpose of the analysis.
From a long-term perspective, changes infertility behavior are de-
cisive for the size and age structure of a given population in the absence 
of sudden catastrophic events. The UN model, in accordance with the 
new evidences of recovery of post-transitional fertility (Goldstein et al., 
2009), predicts convergence of total fertility rates in the region towards 
the level of 1.8 by the end of the century. Since the projection horizon 
in this Chapter ends by 2055, the total fertility rate across the region 
3 Reliability of the UN population estimation for Macedonia is also disputable as 
it is based on distant population census (2002). Since we have no enough grou-
nds for better estimation, we kept the initial population from the UN dataset.
4 While calculating initial population, we took into account a dispute between 
the two constitutional entities (Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia 
& Herzegovina) on the final results of the 2013 census relying on the recent 
literature overview on the topic (Josipovič, 2016; Nikitović, 2016).
5 UN data set recognizes only Serbia including disputed territory of Kosovo 
(it unilaterally proclaimed independence from Serbia in 2008) in accordance 
with the UNSCR No. 1244/1999.
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will experience mild increase, ranging between 1.55 (Bosnia &Herze-
govina and Vojvodina) and 1.84 (Slovenia) in the final year. Details on 
the specific adjustments of input parameters (initial population, fertil-
ity, mortality, and migration rates) for the region of former Yugoslavia, 
which were used for the projection simulations presented and inter-
preted in this Chapter, are described in: Nikitović (2016).
When transforming previously determined general patterns of 
net migration hypothesis to projection numbers, we started from the 
revised UN migration dataset. Technically, we modeled net migration 
in terms of rates rather than absolute numbers since future net migra-
tion does not relate to the future population and, thus, it may take on 
unrealistic values. A hypothesis about future average annual net migra-
tion rate is made for each five-year projection period.6 There are two 
reference points in the projection horizon – zero net migration at some 
point in the period, and the target rate at the end of the projection (net 
migration per thousand of the 2015 initial population), while for Slo-
venia and Kosovo only the target rate is made. The rates are changing 
linearly between these reference points.
The benchmarks for the forecast of net migration rates were both 
the current population projections by Eurostat (Europop2013) and 
national statistical agencies, and recent studies on impact of migra-
tion on demographic change. For the sub-region of ‘Early starters’, we 
referred to Europop2013 target levels for the mid-century (Eurostat, 
2016).For Slovenia, the target rate is taken from Europop2013, while 
for Central Serbia and Vojvodina, it is assumed to be similar to that 
of Croatia. Yet, unlike the Europop2013, we account for the strong 
post-accession emigration in Central Serbia, Vojvodina, and Croa-
tia due to increased labor mobility associated with slow economic 
growth in new EU members by analogy to the evidence from the 
Eastern enlargement (Kupiszewski, 2006; Kupiszewski et al, 2012), 
and based on the expectations from the future in the EU (Nikitović, 
2013; Rašević et al, 2014).
Technically, the projection method is cohort-component, widely 
used among demographers, but the approach for obtaining medium or 
6 The age and sex distribution of the future net migration were derived accor-
ding to the UN model (UN, 2015a: 30) taking into account specific patterns 
for the region (Kupiszewski et al, 2012: 107).
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most probable variant, is based on probabilistic projections of future 
fertility and mortality. We followed the UN approach to use the median 
of probabilistic distribution of both future paths of total fertility rate 
and life expectancy at birth as the most probable variant of these com-
ponents of demographic change (Raftery et al, 2014). For the sake of 
an insight in ‘theoretical’ limits of future demographic change, we have 
also calculated the UN traditional high and low variants, which differ 
from the medium variant (forecast) in total fertility rate by +/0.5 chil-
dren per woman, respectively. In line with the main goal of the Chapter, 
we will focus on the medium variant, i.e. the Forecast (we will use this 
term hereafter) and Zero-migration variant.
Thus, the results of the projection should be considered as the ex-
ercise which implemented theconcept of migration transition (in the 
framework of the UN model) across the region of former Yugoslavia 
in order to assess the impact of such a migration future on popula-
tion dynamics of the region. It should be noted that the turning point 
from net emigration to net immigration is determined according to 
the current prospects of further EU enlargement to the Western Bal-
kans. Projection simulations presented in this Chapter were carried out 
by the means of specific statistical packages within the open-source 
software R, developed by the team from the University of Washington 
(Ševčíková et al, 2015a; Ševčíková et al, 2015b; Ševčíková et al, 2016). 
The packages contain procedures for the execution of the complete 
population projection according to the methods used for the2015 Revi-
sion of the World population prospects. For details on the method, in-
cluding transformations of probabilistic distributions of synthetic indi-
cators (total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth) into age and sex 
specific rates required for projecting future population, see in: Raftery 
et al.(2014); UN(2015a).
Results of the projection simulations
General facts on the future population dynamics
According to the most likely path (median of distribution) of 
the UN based forecast simulation, the total population of the coun-
tries in the region of ex-Yugoslavia will drop from 21.20 to 17.61 
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million between 2015 and 2055, a decrease of 16.9 percent over the 
next forty years. The main driver of this decrease will be the nega-
tive natural change, at 3.468 million, which will be much larger, 
in absolute terms, than the negative net migration, namely 125 
thousand. Significant structural changes should be expected, as the 
share of population aged 65 and above will increase by 75% (from 
16.37% to 28.64%) over the forecast period. If we take a look across 
the former republics and provinces of Yugoslavia (Figure 2.1.1), only 
Kosovo will not experience decline in total population. However, the 
population decrease, as to the median of the prediction interval, will 
not be of high magnitude in Slovenia (1.5%), Macedonia (7.8%), 
and Montenegro (8.2%). On the other side, a strong decline is ex-
pected in Vojvodina (31.7%), Central Serbia (27.2%), Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (22.0%), and Croatia (18.9%). If compared to the 
period before the dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia, Slovenia 
and Bosnia & Herzegovina exchanged their positions with regards 
to the group of population change they  belong to. Net migration ap-
peared to be the main reason of the reversal. Furthermore, Figure 
2.1.1. suggests that significant chances for maintaining actual popu-
lation size by the mid-century refer only to Slovenia and particu-
larly to Kosovo. Yet, the decline of Kosovo’s population is expected 
as of 2035 due to continuing lowering of TFR. For other territories, 
we can firmly say that the population decline cannot be stopped in 
the following decades. Most interestingly, the traditional high and 
low variant in regular UN world population prospects, representing 
bounds of +/ 0.5 in relation to the TFR of the UN medium variant, 
are much wider than the 80% prediction interval of the forecast even 
in the case of Kosovo. It indicates that the role of migration bal-
ance could be of greater importance for the region on a long run if 
compared to the previous periods. It is further discussed in the next 
sub-chapter as the projection results are decomposed with regards to 
the impact of net migration.
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Figure 2.1.1: Population forecast (median and 80% prediction 
interval) of the region of former Yugoslavia across its entities, 




80% prediction interval TFR +/– 0.5
lower limit median upper limit −0.5 +0.5
Slovenia
2015   2,067,526      
2035 2,034,417 2,077,694 2,121,628 1,988,384 2,168,897
2055 1,942,339 2,036,564 2,139,674 1,817,080 2,277,018
Croatia
2015   4,240,317      
2035 3,671,146 3,822,536 3,959,008 3,641,534 4,020,620
2055 3,057,795 3,438,240 3,716,870 3,023,765 3,897,900
Vojvodina
2015   1,855,571      
2035 1,461,097 1,500,021 1,539,506 1,425,636 1,572,327
2055 1,187,610 1,268,060 1,350,326 1,104,714 1,447,986
Central Serbia
2015   5,140,644      
2035 4,153,445 4,279,935 4,389,473 4,070,693 4,487,032
2055 3,478,100 3,741,154 3,976,102 3,272,474 4,260,945
Bosnia & 
Herzeg.
2015   3,336,159      
2035 2,910,077 3,036,299 3,165,730 2,878,364 3,201,833
2055 2,336,819 2,602,087 2,850,310 2,280,929 2,981,373
Montenegro
2015   625,781      
2035 584,989 611,938 633,595 580,144 645,556
2055 514,705 574,424 624,018 502,387 658,373
Kosovo
2015   1,855,853      
2035 1,980,099 2,067,377 2,155,741 1,942,859 2,195,571
2055 1,829,773 2,028,908 2,244,909 1,753,505 2,353,193
Macedonia
2015   2,078,453      
2035 2,000,313 2,054,909 2,107,681 1,945,838 2,166,371
2055 1,778,462 1,917,250 2,034,864 1,674,383 2,191,691
Source: Author’s calculations
From the policy point of view, a population decrease, especially 
of the magnitude forecasted for Vojvodina, Central Serbia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Croatia should not go unnoticed. Although the times 
when the significance of states was defined mainly by their popula-
tion size may long since be gone, large population decreases could 
result in regional and sub-regional depopulation, both of which have 
been observed in the region of former Yugoslavia for a fairly consider-
able length of time (Nejašmić & Štambuk, 2003; Madzevic et al, 2013; 
Nikitović et al, 2016). A severe population decrease may lead to deficits 
in labor supply, which could be a strong limitation factor for already 
weak economies of the region (Zdravković et al, 2012). To date, except 
for periods of war, the populations in modern economies have been 
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growing, so we have little empirical evidence of the economic conse-
quences of population decline. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to 
curb large population decreases by means of policy measures (Kupisze-
wski et al, 2012).
Impact of migration: the principal inferences from 
the projection model
Given the expected negative impact of below replacement fertility 
on population dynamics in the region of ex-Yugoslavia over the follow-
ing decades, the migration issue comes to the fore in terms of future 
demographic development. This section summarizes the key results 
of forecasted migration impact on population change across the re-
gion from the aspect of the assumed stages of the migration transition 
during the projection. To assess this impact, apart from the Forecast 
simulation, we prepared the Zero migration simulation based on the 
assumptions that all the age-specific fertility and mortality rates are as 
per the Forecast, while the net migration is set to zero. The comparison 
between the two simulations as regards total population size across the 
former constitutive parts of Yugoslavia is presented in Figure 2.1.2.












Slovenia 2,067.5 1,983.9 2,077.7 1,811.8 2,036.6
Croatia 4,240.3 3,863.5 3,822.5 3,414.3 3,438.2
Vojvodina 1,855.6 1,599.5 1,500.0 1,330.9 1,268.1
Central Serbia 5,140.6 4,492.2 4,279.9 3,882.8 3,741.2
Bosnia & Herzeg. 3,336.2 3,084.8 3,036.3 2,642.6 2,602.1
Kosovo 1,855.9 2,251.6 2,067.4 2,419.6 2,028.9
Macedonia 2,078.5 2,072.1 2,054.9 1,930.6 1,917.3
Former Yugoslavia (YU) 21,200.3 19,965.7 19,450.7 18,005.7 17,606.7
YU ’Earlystarters’ 13,304.1 11,939.1 11,680.2 10,439.8 10,484.0
YU ‘Latestarters’ 7,896.2 8,026.6 7,770.5 7,565.9 7,122.7
Source: Author’s calculations
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This impact of migration may be decomposed into a direct and 
an indirect component. The former consists of the total net migration 
flows summed over the forecast period, while the latter refers to the 
births and deaths which the migration either prevented or caused to 
happen, depending on the overall direction of migration flows, also 
summed over the forecast period. It should be noted that, in terms 
of indirect migration impact, no reference is made to the hypotheti-
cal demographic events which might have happened to the emigrants 
had they not emigrated. Figure 2.1.3. shows the calculation of all the 
migration-related components of population change.
As to the assumptions of the forecast model, the turning point 
is set to the year of 2035 when it is assumed that large post-accession 
emigration waves, induced by the EU enlargement towards Western 
Balkans, will disappear throughout the region (except for Kosovo).
Figure 2.1.3: Impact of migration on population change – difference 




Migration impact 2015–2035 (000) Migration impact 2035–2055 (000)
Total Direct
Indirect
(natural change) Total Direct
Indirect
(natural change)
Total Births Deaths Total Births Deaths
Slovenia 93.8 85.0 8.8 13.2 4.4 131.0 104.0 27.0 45.0 18.1
Croatia −40.9 −30.0 −10.9 −9.8 1.1 64.8 71.0 −6.2 −1.7 4.4
Vojvodina −99.5 −75.4 −24.1 −21.7 2.3 36.6 50.4 −13.8 −14.4 −0.6
Central Serbia −212.3 −160.3 −52.0 −48.5 3.5 70.6 107.1 −36.5 −33.9 2.5
Bosnia & Herzeg. −48.5 −38.0 −10.5 −9.3 1.2 7.9 20.0 −12.0 −10.4 1.6
Montenegro −6.1 −4.0 −2.1 −1.7 0.5 7.4 13.0 −5.6 −1.6 4.0
Kosovo −184.2 −148.3 −35.9 −32.2 3.7 −206.5 −118.6 −87.8 −79.3 8.5
Macedonia −17.2 −13.0 −4.2 −4.0 0.3 3.9 12.0 −8.1 −5.0 3.0
Former YU −515.0 −384.1 −130.9 −114.0 16.9 115.9 258.8 −142.9 −98.2 44.7
YU ‘Earlystarters’ −258.9 −180.8 −78.1 −66.9 11.2 303.1 332.5 −29.4 −4.5 24.9
YU ‘Latestarters’ −256.1 −203.3 −52.8 −47.2 5.6 −187.1 −73.7 −113.5 −94.5 19.0
Source: Author’s calculations
According to the Forecast, the population in the region of former 
Yugoslavia in 2035 will be smaller by 515 thousand than it would be if 
there were no migration. The direct impact of migration on popula-
tion in the forecast equals 384 thousand. This is the net migration, 
aggregated over the period from 2015 to 2035. In the case of negative 
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net migration, the indirect impact of migration consists of both the 
loss of births owing to the emigration of potential mothers and the loss 
of the emigrants’ deaths. As Figure 2.1.3 suggests, the effect of the lat-
ter is small. The number of births which female emigrants would have 
delivered had they not emigrated during the first 20-year period of the 
forecast accounts for 114 thousand. The number of deaths was reduced 
by 17 thousand by migration; these people might have died anyway, 
but their death occurred after they emigrated, so it cannot be counted 
in the figures for ex-Yugoslavia, as they did not number among the 
population of the region at the time of death. The overall indirect im-
pact of migration is 131 thousand.
Migration induced population decline in the region would be 
even stronger by 2035 if Slovenia is excluded, with Kosovo, Vojvodina, 
and Central Serbia as the most prominent emigration area. In relative 
terms, migration is directly or indirectly responsible for almost 30% of 
the overall population decline expected in the region over the first 20-
year period of the Forecast. In the case of Kosovo, net emigration rep-
resents strong counterweight to the very high positive natural change 
(21% of the initial population), thus reducing expected population in-
crease by almost a half by 2035. During the same period, the popula-
tion size of Slovenia will not decrease exclusively due to net immigra-
tion, as it is expected to fully annul the negative natural change over 
the period (Figures 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.).
About 25% of the migration induced (direct and indirect) decline 
of population in the region of former Yugoslavia by 2035 is due to 
migration-related, potential, but not ‘consumed’, natural change. This 
share varies between 20% and 35% across the region indicating that 
for every 3–4 emigrants one more is added on account of prevented 
natural change (Figure 2.1.3.).
During the second 20-year period of the Forecast, the population 
decrease in the region of ex-Yugoslavia will be smaller by 116 thousand 
than it would be if there were no migration. However, this benefit from 
the net migration surplus is twice as high if we exclude Kosovo, which 
is the only area with negative net migration over the forecast period. 
Indeed, almost all of the positive migration impact refers to the ‘Ear-
ly starters’ sub-region, while Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia will experience only small migration gains. It is worth not-
ing that despite the reversal of the sign of net migration from negative 
to positive  (direct migration  impact) after 2035, the indirect migration 
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impact (natural change) will remain negative throughout the region over 
the second 20-year period of the forecast except for continuously immi-
grant prevailing Slovenia. The rationale for this result stems from the age 
structure of the population, which is truncated in the most vital parts 
due to decades long emigration. It clearly suggests that the assumed 
amount of positive net migration is not large enough to compensate for 
the negative change in population dynamics induced by previously long 
history of net emigration and below-replacement fertility. The result for 
Slovenia supports this finding. Yet, even the rise of positive net migra-
tion over the projection horizon in this country could hardly maintain 
its total population size in conditions of below-replacement fertility.
Impact of migration: a review of the selected 
demographic indicators
We quantified the impact of migration on selected demographic 
indicators by calculating the percentage difference between the value 
of the indicator for 2035 in the Forecast and the Zero migration simu-
lation, scaled to the latter (Figure 2.1.4.). In the Forecast, the total 
population in the region of ex-Yugoslavia is smaller by 2.6% as a 
result of migration. Migration also has a significant impact on the 
age structure of population. As assumed in the Forecast, it would de-
crease the share of population aged 0–14 in the region by 2.8% and 
increase the share of the population aged 65 and above by 3.9% until 
2035. It would also increase the old-age dependency ratio by 4.7% 
(Figure 2.1.4.). The strongest negative impact of migration is expect-
ed in Kosovo, while the only territory where migration will induce 
increase and rejuvenation of population would be Slovenia.
When we compare projected age structures for 2035 and 2055, the 
main difference refers to the share of young population – the migration 
impact is no more negative across the region in 2055, except for Kosovo 
(Figure 2.1.5.). However, unlike the rest of the region, the negative mi-
gration impact on the share of old population is almost twice as high at 
the end of the projection period in Kosovo if compared to 2035. Finally, 
Slovenia could be singled out as the best example of how continuous 
positive net migration can have long-term benefits for the age structure 
of the population in conditions of below replacement fertility.
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Figure 2.1.4: Migration induced changes for selected demographic 
indicators: percentage difference between Forecast and Zero 
















Slovenia 4.73 2.85 2.00 −1.80 −2.95 −1.89
Croatia −1.06 −1.05 −0.68 1.57 1.20 2.00
Vojvodina −6.22 −5.46 −2.70 8.02 8.11 10.21
Central Serbia −4.73 −4.07 −1.99 6.07 5.62 7.69
Bosnia & Herzeg. −1.57 −1.31 −0.85 1.86 2.01 2.38
Montenegro −0.99 −1.77 −1.76 3.88 2.81 4.55
Kosovo −8.18 −6.49 −5.01 13.43 11.34 13.57
Macedonia −0.83 −0.45 −0.18 0.98 0.68 1.17
Former Yugoslavia (YU) −2.59 −2.82 −1.72 3.92 3.24 4.69
YU ‘Earlystarters’ −2.17 −2.17 −0.98 3.50 3.06 4.59
YU ‘Latestarters’ −3.19 −3.35 −2.66 4.46 4.00 4.82
Source: Author’s calculations
Figure 2.1.5: Migration induced changes for selected demographic 
indicators: percentage difference between Forecast and Zero 
















Slovenia 12.41 4.25 4.96 −6.79 −7.40 −9.51
Croatia 0.70 1.12 0.86 −0.30 0.18 −0.09
Vojvodina −4.72 2.62 0.90 3.40 7.28 5.82
Central Serbia −3.65 1.92 0.41 2.62 5.63 4.51
Bosnia & Herzeg. −1.53 0.08 −0.18 1.31 2.26 2.14
Montenegro 0.23 0.47 0.00 1.36 4.03 1.93
Kosovo −16.15 −8.70 −7.22 20.49 24.43 25.85
Macedonia -0.69 0.00 −0.15 0.96 1.61 1.37
Former Yugoslavia (YU) −2.23 0.00 −0.36 2.73 4.15 4.12
YU ‘Earlystarters’ 0.42 2.39 1.63 0.07 1.65 0.85
YU ‘Latestarters’ −5.86 −3.25 −2.93 6.70 7.99 8.72
Source: Author’s calculations
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Conclusions
If we accept that Europe is in the process of transformation into 
an immigration continent, as well as the process generally spreads 
from the northwest to the southeast, similarly to the widely accepted 
demographic transition, it was assumed that the region of former Yu-
goslavia will be soon heading to the same direction despite its current-
ly unfavorable demographic and migration indicators. Given that the 
transition to net immigration directly depends on economic progress, 
enlargement of the EU towards the Western Balkans is taken as a pre-
requisite for the model and empirical considerations in the Chapter. In 
accordance with the principles of the migration cycle concept, which 
is used as the theoretical framework for the migration assumptions, 
and the experiences of new immigration areas in Europe, we assumed 
a longer period would be needed for societies in the region of former 
Yugoslavia to adapt to the new reality. Not only the migration cycle 
model, but also a longer historical perspective of empirical evidence 
from this region (not explicitly stated in the Chapter), indicate that the 
region will probably experience new immigration on the long run as it 
already was the case throughout the history.
Despite the decisive role of natural change, particularly that of 
fertility, on the decrease and ageing of population in the region of for-
mer Yugoslavia by the mid-century, the simulations of future popu-
lation dynamics based on the theoretical considerations of the post-
transitional mild increase of fertility and long-term transition to net 
immigration suggest that migration component could have important 
impact on demographic change, especially in terms of moderating the 
effects of below-replacement fertility on the age structure.
In addition, the notable indirect migration impact on the decline 
and ageing of population during the net emigration stages highlighted 
significance of side effects of typically young profile of emigrants (loss 
of future births). On the other hand, the sooner a country leaves the 
pre-transitional stage, the faster the country’s age structure will face 
positive impact of migration. Thus, the transition to stable net im-
migration will increasingly gain in importance over the next decades 
given the negative demographic momentum in the region, which will 
affect even Kosovo – the youngest European population. Furthermore, 
achieving the long-term post-transformation stage of stable net immi-
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gration, as showed in the simulations for Slovenia, should be the ulti-
mate policy goal for the whole region. However, the region of former 
Yugoslavia is currently being far from both the significant increase of 
fertility and the attractiveness to immigrants. Thus, the reduction of 
net emigration should be one of the primary tasks of population and 
economic policies in the next decades.
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